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#2A - 1/31/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD L. BRIDGHAM, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10857 
PROFESSIONAL-FIREFIGHTERS—ASSOCIATION 
LOCAL 27 4, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
RICHARD L. BRIDGHAM, pro se 
THOMAS F. DE SOYE, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Richard L. Bridgham excepts to an Administrative Law Judge's 
(ALJ) dismissal, after hearing,-'' of his improper practice 
charge against the Professional Firefighters Association, Local 
274, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association), which alleges that the 
Association violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by refusing to represent him at an 
arbitration concerning a grievance he had filed against his 
employer, the City of White Plains (employer). The Association 
cross-excepts to the ALJ's decision to receive evidence 
concerning an allegation that the Association improperly analyzed 
Bridgham's grievance. The Association contends that the ALJ's 
!/By decision dated May 14, 1990 (23 PERB J[3021) , this Board 
reversed the same ALJ's decision (23 PERB ^[4511) dismissing 
Bridgham's charge without hearing, and remanded the matter for 
further proceedings. Following two days of hearing, the ALJ again 
dismissed Bridgham's charge for failure of proof, a decision from 
which Bridgham now appeals. 
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ruling was incorrect because the charge is limited to an 
allegation that the Association breached its duty of fair 
representation by withdrawing the grievance "in conflict with the 
explicit language of the . . . contract." 
On November 4, 1987, Bridgham was injured on the job, 
suffering a lacerated arm and lower back strain, according to his 
and the employer's physicians. Bridgham was directed by his 
employer to return to light duty on December 21, 1987, an 
instruction he disobeyed upon advice from a third physician who 
recommended bed rest for a possible herniated disk. 
Based upon his failure to return to work, together with a 
statement from the employer's physician that Bridgham was 
sufficiently recovered from his on-the-job injuries to return to 
light duty, the employer converted Bridgham's absence from "line 
of duty" leave pursuant to §207-a of the General Municipal Law 
(GML), to ordinary sick leave. Bridgham was then ordered 
confined to his home pursuant to the employer's ordinary sick 
leave policy. Bridgham returned to work for light duty on 
January 6, 1988, and he worked until February 8, when he retired 
under a 2 0-year service retirement option. Pursuant to an 
application made on his behalf by the Association's counsel, 
Bridgham's service retirement was converted in September 1988 to 
an accidental disability retirement, retroactive to. his actual 
retirement on February 8, 1988. 
In February 1988, the Association filed, on Bridgham's 
behalf, a contract grievance alleging that the employer's order 
,__ Board U-10857 -3 
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of confinement, which remained in place from December 21, 1987 to 
January 6, 1988, violated the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement because Bridgham's absence for that period was 
occasioned by an on-the-job injury to which an order of 
confinement was not properly applicable. 
On October 14, 1988, the date of the scheduled arbitration, 
the employer agreed to "concede" the grievance if the Association 
could establish that Bridgham's absence for the period in 
question was a "207-a" absence by proof that his herniated disk 
was the result of the on-the-job injury which occurred on 
November 4, 1987. On the same day, the Association was advised 
by Bridgham, apparently for the first time, that immediately 
) . . . . . . 
following his ordinary service retirement m February 1988, he 
had accepted and continued in alternative private employment as a 
chauffeur. In January 1989, following an exchange of medical 
documentation, the Association informed Bridgham that it would 
not proceed to arbitration with his grievance because his 
acceptance of the alternative employment jeopardized his 
entitlement to GML §207-a benefits. With the Association's 
permission, Bridgham proceeded to arbitration with the assistance 
of privately retained counsel. He subsequently received an 
arbitration award which held that the order of confinement in 
effect for the period December 21, 1987 to January 6, 1988 did 
not violate the collective bargaining agreement because Bridgham 
had not established that his herniated disk was the result of an 
I 
on-the-job injury. Therefore, the employer's rules, including 
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the order of confinement applicable to ordinary sick leave, were 
properly applied. 
At issue before us is whether the Association acted in an 
arbitrary manner when it refused to represent Bridgham at the 
arbitration in connection with his "order of confinement" 
grievance.-7 Bridgham contends that the explanation provided by 
the Association for its refusal to represent him (i.e., that his 
acceptance of private employment might adversely affect his 
entitlement to GML §2 07-a benefits and, therefore, his contract 
grievance) is patently wrong and, therefore, arbitrary. We 
disagree. 
It is unclear to us whether Bridgham's employment as a 
chauffeur on and after February 18, 1988 could have adversely 
affected his entitlement to "line of duty" benefits and, 
consequently, the merits of his confinement grievance for the 
period December 21, 1987 to January 6, 1988. Nevertheless, 
Bridgham's argument that the absence of a clear connection 
between the two matters establishes an arbitrary refusal to 
proceed to arbitration is without merit. The Association had a 
reasonable basis to advise Bridgham that he should discontinue 
his efforts at arbitration to obtain overtime compensation for 
the period of time to which the order of confinement applied 
because, by pursuing that issue, he could separately jeopardize his 
entitlement to the payment made by the employer pursuant to GML 
j -''Bridgham does not claim that the Association's decision was 
discriminatory or made in bad faith. 
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§2 07-a, which supplements the disability retirement allowance 
received by him from February 8, 1988 onward. The Association's 
concern about the potential for Bridgham to lose this supplemental 
payment, and its subsequent refusal to participate in an 
arbitration proceeding at which the issue of other employment would 
i-n—a-1-1—InL-kel-ihood—be—raised^—reflects—a— concern—for—Bridgham—s 
welfare and the welfare of other unit employees similarly situated 
which comports with its duty of fair representation. We hold, 
therefore, that even if Bridgham is correct that there is no 
obvious connection between the order of confinement grievance and 
his subsequent employment, the Association's refusal to proceed to 
arbitration was reasonably based and was not arbitrary or otherwise 
violative of §209-a.2(a) of the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ALJ's 
decision be, and it hereby is, affirmed, Bridgham's exceptions are 
denied, and the charge is dismissed in its entirety.-'' 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Ch.^M, 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter* L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
/ 
-
7In dismissing Bridgham's charge, we deny the Association's cross-
exceptions to whatever extent the Association argues that the 
charge is something other than what we have characterized it to be. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- GASE-NQ.—U—1-1-7 94 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE 
OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS and DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11812 
STATE OF NEW YORK (GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF 
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS and DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
ROGER L. SCALES, for Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), for 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (RICHARD J. DAUTNER of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations and Department 
of Health) (State) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
Board - U-11794 & U-11812 
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(ALJ) on two improper practice charges, one filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF), the other by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA). Both PEF and CSEA allege that the State violated 
§-2-0-9^ a—l-(-d-)—o-f—the—Public- Employe es-^ —Fair—Empl-Qym-e-nt-A-G-fe—(-A-e-t-) 
when it discontinued a practice of allowing employees to attend a 
picnic during working hours without any charge to their leave 
accruals.-'' 
After hearing, the ALJ concluded that there was a practice 
of granting paid leave to attend the picnic when consistent with 
the department's operational needs. The ALJ held that the 
State's decision to not sponsor the 1990 picnic was based upon 
fiscal concerns which was inconsistent with that practice. 
The State argues in its exceptions that the ALJ 
misinterpreted its practice of permitting employees to take up to 
3.7 5 hours to attend a picnic without charge to their leave 
accruals. According to the State, its practice is conditioned 
upon an annual determination by the department's chief executive 
officer that attendance at a social activity without charge to 
accruals is beneficial to employee relations and is in the 
department's best interests. The State argues that this 
determination is necessarily reserved to management's discretion 
-'CSEA also alleges that the State's action violated 
§209-a.l(a) of the Act. The ALJ dismissed this allegation for lack 
of proof and no exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the 
ALJ's decision. 
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and that current fiscal conditions and the perceptions flowing 
from a sponsored picnic in times of fiscal stringency are 
properly considered by the department when it assesses its best 
interests. 
I±—is—cXear-_that—employees—hav-e— been—permitted—to—attend— a 
picnic on work time without charge to accruals only when the 
department has sponsored the picnic. Although the department has 
sponsored a picnic for many years, it is equally clear that a 
decision to sponsor the picnic is made annually and it is not 
automatic. There is also no dispute that the decision to sponsor 
the picnic had to be minimally consistent with the department's 
view of its operational or program needs. We believe, however, 
that the ALJ defined the departmental practice too narrowly and 
incorrectly when he restricted the department's discretion in 
deciding whether to sponsor a picnic to an assessment of its 
operational needs. 
As we read the record, the sole source of the departmental 
practice stems from a state-wide policy memorandum first issued 
in 1970 which covered social activities of different types, 
including picnics, which was subsequently made a part of the 
State's attendance and leave manual which applies to all State 
agencies and departments. That policy reserves unfettered 
discretion to the chief executive officer of each agency to 
decide whether the planned social activity will be in the 
agency's best interests. We do not find any persuasive evidence 
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in the record to support a conclusion that the Department of 
Health was operating under some different standard in deciding 
each year whether to sponsor an agency picnic. We also hold that 
the best interests standard is broad enough to include the fiscal 
and__r_el_a_t_ed_aoncern s__a rticu 1 at ecLby_the_St ate_as„ jbhe^re a son s_why_-
it could not sponsor a departmental picnic for 1990. 
We hold that the State's decision to not sponsor a picnic 
for 1990 was consistent with its practice and that employees were 
not, therefore, entitled to attend a picnic during their working 
hours without appropriate charge to leave accruals. The ALJ's 
decision and order is accordingly reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
^ -and- CA-S-E—NOS U--9 3-9-7 
& U-11611 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
JOHN RYAN and ROGER L. SCALES, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, Esq. (RICHARD J. DAUTNER of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions by the State of New 
York (Department of Health) (State) to a decision rendered by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) after hearing on a charge filed by 
the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF). The ALJ held 
that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the Department of Health (DOH) 
unilaterally promulgated a new policy requiring DOH employees to 
disclose their interests in any entities regulated or supervised 
by DOH. The ALJ held that DOH's policy was mandatorily 
negotiable because the disclosure requirements were in addition 
to the financial reporting requirements under the State "Ethics 
in Government Act" (Ethics Act) .-' 
^N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §73-a (McKinney 1988 and Supp. 1991). 
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The State argues in its exceptions that its interest 
disclosure policy is authorized by Executive Law §94(9) (j) and 
that it is not mandatorily negotiable if a correct balancing test 
is applied. In that latter respect, the State argues that the 
balance—of—competing—interests—should—tip—in—its—favor—because 
its need for the employees' disclosure is great and the required 
interest disclosures are only minimally intrusive of the 
employees' privacy rights. The State also argues that the ALJ's 
remedy is overly broad because the order to rescind the policy is 
not expressly limited to employees in PEF's unit. PEF argues in 
response that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
The charge in U-9397 concerns a financial disclosure policy 
which was superseded in 1989 by the interest disclosure policy 
which is the subject of the charge in U-11611. The ALJ's 
decision is based upon the 1989 policy only. No exceptions were 
filed to the ALJ's declination to consider separately the 
disclosure policy under U-9397. The parties' arguments in their 
briefs and during their oral argument before us were directed 
only to the 1989 policy. Under these circumstances, we limit our 
review and discussion to the issues raised by the 1989 disclosure 
policy. 
DOH's 1989 disclosure policy was promulgated after the 
January 1, 1989 effective date of the financial disclosure 
requirements of the Ethics Act and, as stated by DOH, its policy 
Board - U-9397 & U-11611 
is intended to be an "addition to" and "separate from" the 
financial disclosure requirements of that statute. Under the 
1989 policy, DOH employees must identify on a departmental form 
any entities which are regulated or supervised by DOH in which 
they—or- their—immediate—family—members—either—have—an—interest—o 
conduct activities. The covered interests or activities include 
service as an officer, director, partner, proprietor, employee, 
volunteer, contractor or advisor; receipt of wages, salary, 
interest, capital gain or gift over $75 in value; investment 
activity and indebtedness to the regulated or supervised entity. 
In addition, employees must also list any interest or activities 
involving themselves or their immediate family members which 
might constitute an actual or apparent conflict of interest as 
defined in Public Officers Law §74. Employees are not required, 
however, to describe the nature of the identified interests or 
activities. DOH retains the right to "seek other related 
information as required" and to take "appropriate corrective 
action" if DOH determines a conflict of interest to exist. The 
policy also contains a provision for either an employee or the 
employee's negotiating agent to request an exemption from the 
disclosure requirements under certain specified circumstances. 
Employees who knowingly and intentionally violate the disclosure 
rules may be subject to disciplinary action. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Executive Law §94(9)(j), the claimed source of DOH's 
Board - U-9397 & U-11611 -4 
authorization to promulgate its disclosure policy, sets forth one 
of several duties imposed upon the State Ethics Commission. 
Section 94(9)(j) requires the State Ethics Commission to advise 
and assist agencies in establishing conflict of interest rules. 
Even—i-f—Executive—Law— §-9-4-(-9-)-(-j-)—were-to—be—read—to—i-ndi-reefeiy 
authorize DOH to promulgate conflict of interest work rules, it 
would not be a source of a statutory mandate. Nothing in 
§94(9)(j) required DOH to promulgate its disclosure policy or any 
other conflict of interest rule. Rather, DOH's promulgation of 
its disclosure policy was merely discretionary. The exercise of 
that discretion is mandatorily negotiable to the extent that the 
subject matter of the disclosure policy embraces terms and 
conditions of employment.-'' 
In assessing the negotiability of DOH's interest disclosure 
policy, we find it unnecessary and inappropriate to balance DOH's 
need for the required disclosures against the effects of the 
policy upon the employees' privacy rights or other interests. We 
hold that the Ethics Act codifies not only the general public 
policy associated with State employees' disclosure of actual or 
potential conflicts, but the full extent of the State's 
managerial interests as an employer with respect to that subject 
as well. DOH's disclosure policy, therefore, necessarily 
embraces mandatorily negotiable subject matters to whatever 
-''Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New 
York v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB f7 012 (1990). 
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extent and in whatever respects its required disclosures differ 
from those required by the Ethics Act. DOH's policy is, 
therefore, necessarily negotiable for those DOH employees in 
PEF's unit who are not required to file disclosure statements 
under—the—E-th-ies—Aetr^/—The—same—resuit—ob-ta-ins—for— any—DOH 
employees in PEF's unit who are required to file disclosure 
statements. As DOH's policy duplicates much of the information 
already required of such employees,-/ the State's asserted 
managerial need for an additional source of this information is 
not compelling. Moreover, as to these employees, the methods by 
which the disclosures are obtained and enforced under DOH's 
policy differ from those under the Ethics Act. 
As to the ALJ's remedy, although the order necessarily 
applies only to the DOH employees in PEF's unit, it is 
appropriate on the State's exception to modify the order to 
restrict its application specifically to those employees.-f 
-Employees who hold policy-making positions or who receive 
compensation in excess of the filing rate, which is currently 
equated to the job rate for SG-24, must file disclosure 
statements under the Ethics Act. The record does not show how 
many of the DOH employees in PEF's unit file annual disclosure 
statements under that statute. 
-''The Ethics Act requires reporting individuals to disclose, 
for themselves, their spouses and unemancipated children, inter 
alia, business or professional associations, various financial 
investments and interests, gifts, reimbursements for expenditures 
made in connection with official duties, income and sources 
thereof, real property interests and most liabilities in excess 
of $5,000. 
^Waverlv Cent. School Dist., 23 PERB ^3029 (1990). 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO who work in the Department of Health 
(DOH) that the State of New York will: 
1„ Rescind DOH Executive Memorandum 89-8 dated December 29, 
1989, insofar as it applies, to DOH employees in the unit 
represented by PEF; 
20 Expunge from its files any documents relating to any PEF 
unit employee's noncompliance with any section of the 
subject DOH disclosure policy. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
Board - U-9397 & U-11611 
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For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision and 
order is affirmed, his order is modified as set forth below, and 
the State's exceptions to his decision are dismissed. 
IT IS ORDERED, THEREFORE, that the State: 
1— Rescind—DOH—Executive—Memorandum—8-9— 8—dated 
3. 
December 29, 1989, insofar as it applies to DOH 
employees in the unit represented by PEF; 
Expunge from its files any documents relating to any 
PEF unit employee's noncompliance with any section of 
the subject DOH disclosure policy; 
Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to DOH employees in the unit represented by 
PEF. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
f<ui ,^g K^ Cvr\C</ JL 
Pauline R. Kinsel la , Chairperson 
?UM^Y. 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Member 
Y>T%J6 J . S c h m e r t z , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging—Party-; 
- and - CASE NO. U-11529 
COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF ORANGE 
COUNTY, 
.Respondent. 
In the Matter of 





COUNTY OF ORANGE and SHERIFF OF ORANGE 
COUNTY, CASE NO. U-11708 
Respondent, 
- and -
COUNTY OF ORANGE CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
FERRARO, GOLDSTEIN, YATTO & ZUGIBE (SCOTT M. ALBRECHT of 
counsel), for Charging Party in U-11529 
WILSON & FRANZBLAU (KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU of counsel), 
for Charging Party in U-11708 
PROSKAUER, ROSE, GOETZ & MENDELSOHN (KATHLEEN M. McKENNA 
of counsel), for Respondent 
KAUFF, MCCLAIN & McGUIRE (HARLAN SILVERSTEIN and BETH J. 
FALK of counsel), for Intervenor 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Orange County Deputy Sheriffs Association, Inc. (DSA) 
excepts to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) dismissal of its 
charge in U-11529 which it filed against the County of Orange and 
the—Sher-i-f-f— of— Grange—Country—(-County-)-v—The—DSA—aiieges—that-the 
County violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it insisted upon negotiating for positions which are 
not within DSA's unit. Specifically, the DSA alleges that it 
represents only deputy sheriffs within the Sheriff's Department, and 
that it is no longer permitted or required to represent personnel 
within the Sheriff's Department whose status as deputy sheriffs had 
been removed by the County under a civil service reclassification 
effective in February 1990. The ALJ concluded after a hearing, 
however, that the County's elimination of the deputy sheriff status 
for several of the positions in the Sheriff's Department did not 
alter the composition of the bargaining unit which the DSA had 
represented since 1981. Finding DSA's unit to include both deputed 
and nondeputed positions within the Sheriff's Department, and 
finding that the County's bargaining demands were coextensive with 
the scope of that unit, the ALJ dismissed the DSA's refusal to 
bargain charge. 
The DSA filed several procedural and substantive exceptions to 
the ALJ's decision in U-11529. The County argues in response to 
DSA's exceptions that the ALJ's rulings and findings in that case 
were correct in all relevant respects. 
Board - U-11529 & U-11708 -3 
The DSA also filed the charge in U-11708 in which it alleges 
that the County violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (d) of the Act when it 
recognized the County of Orange Correction Officers Benevolent 
Association (COBA) as the negotiating agent for all of the Sheriff's 
Department—personnels—On—a—stipulated—record-,^the—ALJ—held—that—the 
County's withdrawal of recognition from the DSA and its 
contemporaneous recognition of COBA violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of 
the Act, but not §209-a.l(b). The ALJ held that COBA's recognition 
was improper because it extended to COBA the right to represent the 
deputy sheriffs whom the DSA has always claimed to represent. 
COBA has also filed an exception to the ALJ's denial of its 
motion to intervene in U-11529. COBA and the County argue in their 
exceptions in U-11708 that COBA's recognition was privileged both 
because DSA abandoned its unit and as a matter of law apart from any 
abandonment theory. 
A brief recitation of the background facts places the ALJ's 
decisions and the parties' exceptions in proper context. 
DSA was certified by us as the bargaining agent for "all full-
time deputy sheriffs" in April 1981 after we had fragmented those 
employees from a County-wide unit.-/ That same unit description 
also appears in the contracts between DSA and the County, the last 
of which expired on December 31, 1989. At the date of 
^County of Orange and Sheriff of the County of Orange, 14 PERB 
<J[«H3012 and 3000.29 (1981). 
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certification, all of the employees in the Sheriff's Department were 
deputed. Effective in February 1990, the County eliminated the 
deputy sheriff status for correction officers and a number of other 
positions within the Sheriff's Department. Road patrol personnel 
and—commun-tcations—of fdcers—are-,—howeve^—stirl-1— deputed——DSA—:rater-
notified the County that it did not and would not represent the 
correction officers and the other positions which were no longer 
deputed. The County disagreed with the DSA's assertion because it 
did not believe that any of the duties of the affected employees had 
been changed. Believing that the nondeputed positions were still in 
DSA's unit, the County sought through mid-March 19 9 0 to have DSA 
bargain for them, which precipitated DSA's first charge. 
In early May 1990, COBA requested that the County recognize it 
as the negotiating agent for a unit consisting of deputy sheriffs 
and those other positions which had been deputed before January 
199 0. After verifying through a third party that COBA had majority 
support within the unit for which it demanded recognition, the 
County, in late May, withdrew recognition from DSA and recognized 
COBA as the exclusive bargaining agent for the entire unit for which 
the County alleges the DSA was certified in 1981. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of 
the charge in U-11529 and his findings of violation in 
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U-11708, cases which we have consolidated for decision because they 
raise common issues. 
Preliminarily, we affirm the ALJ's ruling denying COBA's motion 
to intervene in U-11529 for the reasons stated in his decision. 
Turning—next—to—DSA-'-s—exceptrons—which—are—directed—to—the 
ALJ's processing of U-11529, it alleges that the ALJ erred when he 
refused to grant its motion for summary judgment or a directed 
verdict. DSA premised its motion upon the County's alleged improper 
recognition of COBA.-' As established by the decisions in these 
cases, however, the County's recognition of COBA and its insistence 
that DSA bargain for all of the titles in the historic unit are 
distinct legal issues. One issue is not dispositive of the other 
and, therefore, the ALJ was correct in denying DSA's motion, 
assuming it to have been properly framed. 
DSA also alleges that the ALJ erred by disallowing the 
introduction of an affidavit of Joseph M. Dwyer, the County's 
Commissioner of Personnel. Dwyer's affidavit was submitted in an 
unrelated court proceeding to support an allegation that the DSA did 
not have standing to pursue an appeal in that matter. 
One of the County's arguments in response to this exception is 
that the ALJ's evidentiary ruling was not preserved for appeal 
because it was not argued by DSA in its brief to the ALJ. However, 
-'On the date the DSA made its motion, the ALJ had not issued his 
decision in U-11708 in which he held that COBA had been 
improperly recognized by the County. 
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having made an offer of the document into evidence at the hearing, 
and having had the ALJ then refuse to accept it into evidence, the 
DSA was not required to reargue that same point in a post-hearing 
memorandum to the same ALJ to preserve an opportunity to argue to us 
that—the-ALJ-'-s—ru-1-i-ng—was—incorrect. 
On the merits of this exception, in relevant part, Dwyer's 
affidavit merely restates DSA's position regarding the scope of its 
unit and the extent of its duty to represent County employees; it 
does not set forth the County's position on those issues. The ALJ's 
exclusion of the affidavit and any testimony related thereto was, 
therefore, correct. 
The DSA also alleges that the parol evidence rule barred the 
ALJ from taking evidence regarding the composition of the unit 
because the reference to "all full-time deputy sheriffs" is clear on 
its face. The parol evidence rule, however, is not applicable in 
this case, even assuming the conditions for its invocation were 
otherwise present, because it is the meaning of our certification 
order which is in issue, not the meaning of the parties' contractual 
recognition clause. There being no evidence that the parties ever 
agreed to change the composition of the certified unit, the parties' 
contract must be viewed to have merely adopted the unit as 
certified. Inherent in our power to issue a certification order is 
the unrestricted statutory power to review that order as appropriate 
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in any case in which an interpretation of the order is relevant to 
the disposition of the pending administrative proceeding. 
The DSA also alleges that the ALJ was powerless to consider 
whether nondeputed titles are within its unit because that question 
can-be-appropriately—raised— oniy—in—a— unit—clarrf-icatron—proceedrng 
filed pursuant to §201.2(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules). The 
unit clarification rules, however, were never intended to be the 
exclusive means by which parties could obtain an interpretation of 
the scope of an existing bargaining unit. To the contrary, the unit 
clarification procedures were adopted to provide parties with a 
nonadversarial alternative to the improper practice proceedings 
which had been used, and still may be used, to secure an 
interpretation of the composition of a negotiating unit. The 
improper practice charge filed by the DSA necessitated an 
interpretation of DSA's unit description because the parties' duty 
to bargain is fixed by that unit configuration. The ALJ was both 
privileged and required to make that interpretation and no error can 
be attributed to him for having done so. 
It is also alleged that by his decision the ALJ found an 
inappropriate negotiating unit. The ALJ, however, made only a 
factual determination regarding the scope of the currently existing 
unit. The ALJ made no finding as to whether the existing unit or a 
unit limited to deputized employees is most appropriate. Whether, 
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as DSA argues, deputy sheriffs should be afforded representation in 
a separate unit because of the distinctions now existing between 
deputed and nondeputed personnel in the Sheriff's Department is not 
an issue under the improper practice charge DSA filed against the 
County^ — 
All of DSA's remaining exceptions rest directly or indirectly 
on its repeated assertion that its unit consists only of those 
persons who are deputy sheriffs. As correctly determined by the 
ALJ, however, we established DSA's unit because of the unique joint 
employer relationship between the County and the Sheriff. Our 
certification in 1981 of a unit consisting of all full-time deputy 
sheriffs encompassed all of the departmental personnel who were, and 
are, covered by that joint employer relationship. There being no 
claim or evidence that the now nondeputed titles in the Sheriff's 
Department are no longer subject to that joint employer 
relationship, those titles which were included in the unit when they 
were deputed continue to be part of the unit for which DSA was 
certified despite the removal of the deputy sheriff designation.^ 
Therefore, the County did not violate the Act by insisting that DSA 
negotiate regarding the terms and conditions of employment of the 
nondeputed titles. 
-
7We make no determination as to whether the unit would be most 
appropriately fragmented pursuant to a petition properly filed 
and adequately supported by a record developed in such a 
representation proceeding. Our holding here relates only to the 
composition of the unit as established and defined in 1981. 
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Turning to the exceptions taken to the AKJ's decision in 
U-11708, we first reject the County's and COBA's contention that the 
recognition of COBA was permissible on the facts of this case 
because the DSA abandoned or repudiated its unit when it claimed to 
represent only—deputed—personnel-^—i-r-respeeti-ve-o-f—the—subsequent 
petition it filed to represent such a unit.-'' Although in U-11529 
we have held that the DSA was mistaken in its belief that only 
deputy sheriffs are included in its unit, its belief was based upon 
an arguable interpretation of the language in our certification 
order. Other than by the hindsight afforded by our decision in U-
11529, DSA's position regarding the composition of its unit was no 
less arguable than the County's position that the unit description 
in our certification order should not be read literally. An 
abandonment or repudiation claim cannot be based upon a party's 
mistaken interpretation of the scope of its bargaining unit because 
there is in that circumstance no intent to abandon representation of 
the unit, of whatever it may consist. The representation petition 
it filed does not evidence an abandonment because the DSA, by that 
petition, merely sought to preserve the unit it understood to be in 
existence. Therefore, we reject any argument that DSA must be held 
-''The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissed that petition in a decision reported at 
24 PERB H4017 (1991). The Director held that DSA's petition was 
untimely under §201.3(c) of the Rules because COBA's recognition 
had been nullified by the ALJ. No exceptions have been filed to 
the Director's decision. 
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to have abandoned or repudiated its unit simply because we have 
dismissed DSA's charge in U-11529. 
Alternatively, COBA and the County argue that any public 
employer is statutorily permitted to withdraw recognition from an 
incumbent—union—and—tG—extend—recognition^to—another—union—whenever 
the incumbent union is open to challenge by anyone under a 
representation petition if the employer has objective evidence that 
the new union to be recognized has the support of a majority of 
employees within the unit.-'' 
The County and COBA both argue that the ALJ erred when he 
relied upon our decisions in County of Orange-7 and Greece Union 
Free School District-7 to support his findings of a violation. 
County of Orange was allegedly misapplied by the ALJ because it 
involved an employer's unilateral alteration of a bargaining unit, 
whereas here, the County left the unit unchanged in fact, but 
substituted a bargaining agent for that unit. Greece Union Free 
School District was allegedly misapplied by the ALJ because that 
case involved an issue about an employer's right to file a 
decertification petition during a period in which a filing was not 
authorized by our Rules. The County and COBA submit that these 
-/The County recognized COBA in May 1990. DSA's last contract 
with the County expired on December 31, 1989, making May 1, 1990 
the beginning of an open period for petitions for decertification 
by employees or for petitions for certification by any union 
other than the DSA. 
-
714 PERB H3060 (1981) . 
Z/18 PERB H3033 (1985) . 
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cases are not dispositive of the County's right to recognize COBA as 
the bargaining agent for the unit historically represented by the 
DSA. 
In County of Orange, we overruled a line of cases which had 
perm-it-ted—an—empl-oyer—to—effect—a—^uni-Latera-1-ehange^-n—a—negotiating 
unit during an open period for representation challenges. As did 
the ALJ, we view County of Orange to be dispositive of this case. 
An employer's change in a negotiating unit is a pro tanto withdrawal 
of recognition from the union that represents that unit. Properly 
viewed, the change in the unit is only one means by which the 
withdrawal of recognition is effected. Therefore, County of Orange 
necessarily prohibits an employer's partial withdrawal of 
recognition, whether or not the withdrawal of recognition is 
accompanied by a change in the unit. It follows, a fortiori, that a 
total withdrawal of recognition from one union in favor of another 
violates the Act under County of Orange. Since that decision, our 
statements in earlier cases, most often in dicta, which suggest that 
an employer may be privileged to withdraw recognition under certain 
circumstances, can no longer be considered controlling.-'' 
County of Orange and Greece Union Free School District, taken 
together, represent our opinion that the policies of the Act are 
best served by requiring that representation disputes be channeled 
through the procedures available under our Rules rather than left to 
g/See, e.g. , Hempstead Union Free School Dist. , 7 PERB ?[3 017 
(1974) . 
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an employer's unilateral action. We believe that in this way 
instability and uncertainty in the parties' labor relations will be 
eliminated or minimized and the rights of all parties can best be 
protected. In that respect, we disagree completely with the 
Go-u-n-ty-^-s—e-l-a-i-m—th-a-t-;i-fes—;r e co gnit-ion—o -f— G O B A—^-s t a-b-i-1-i-z-e d—-1-a-b o-r-
relations." One need only look to the record of these proceedings 
to see the unfortunate consequences of a contrary holding which 
would privilege an employer's withdrawal of recognition. 
We emphasize that parties will not be disadvantaged or 
prejudiced by our requiring that they use the procedures of this 
Board to effect a change in an established bargaining relationship, 
whether it be the composition of the unit or the identity of the 
bargaining agent. In this case, for example, a unit clarification 
petition could have been filed by either the County or the DSA to 
resolve the unit status of the nondeputed titles because they were 
"new or substantially altered positions" within the meaning and for 
the purpose of the unit clarification rules. A decertification 
petition also could have been filed on or after May 1, 1990 by the 
employees themselves, or COBA or any other union could have filed a 
certification petition to represent the unit for which COBA was 
recognized or any part thereof alleged to be appropriate.-7 DSA's 
majority support could then have been tested, as necessary, in the 
^COBA eventually did file a representation petition seeking 
certification as the bargaining agent for a unit of Sheriff's 
Department personnel. That petition is now pending before the 
Director. 
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context of an orderly election process, and during the pendency of 
such a petition, the County would not have been permitted or 
required to bargain with DSA, thereby obviating any concern about 
dealing with a nonmajority union. The availability of these several 
admin-istra-tive—procedures—and—the—protections—theix_utiXiza±ion 
afford all parties persuade us that there is insufficient reason to 
permit an employer unilaterally to withdraw recognition from an 
incumbent union. 
COBA's remaining exceptions in U-11708 require little comment. 
The ALJ's decision to process that case to completion before 
deciding U-11529 was a matter reserved to the exercise of his 
discretion. As no prejudice to the parties has been 
shown, we will not disturb the ALJ's decision. A violation of §209-
a.l(a) of the Act need not be premised upon a specific finding of 
animus when, as here, the conduct interferes with fundamental 
statutory rights.—/ Similarly, the County's refusal to bargain 
with DSA is inherent in the County's withdrawal of recognition from 
DSA and its recognition of COBA as the exclusive bargaining agent 
for the unit for which DSA has been certified. 
For the reasons set forth above, the County's and COBA's 
exceptions in U-11708 are denied as are the DSA's exceptions in 
U-11529 and the ALJ's decision in each case is affirmed. 
-'See, e.g. , State of New York, 10 PERB 5[3108 (1977) . 
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IT IS ORDERED, THEREFORE, that the County: 
1. Immediately rescind its recognition of COBA as the 
negotiating agent for titles which are in the 
negotiating unit for which the DSA is the certified 
negotiating agent; ^ 
2. Forthwith publish notice of its rescission of COBA's 
recognition in the same periodicals which published 
notice of its recognition of COBA; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to 
Sheriff's Department employees. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
w <>\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Erie J. Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Orange County 
Deputy Sheriffs Association, Inc, (DSA) that the County of Orange and 
Sheriff of Orange County: 
1. Will immediately rescind its recognition of the 
County of Orange Correction Officers Benevolent Association 
(COBA) as the exclusive negotiating agent for titles which 
are in the unit for which the DSA is the certified bargaining 
agent; and 
2„ Will forthwith publish notice of its rescission of 
the recognition granted COBA in the same periodicals which 
published notice of its recognition of COBA„ 
County of Orange and 
Sheriff, of. Orange. .County. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material _ ._ .. .._._ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
DUTCHESS COUNTY EDUCATION LOCAL NO. 867, 
ARLINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO/ 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10496 
ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (JEROME LEFKOWITZ and 
PAUL S. BAMBERGER of counsel), for Charging Party 
RAYMOND G. KUNTZ, ESQ., for Respondent 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON, ESQ. (LEONARD A. SCHRIER of 
counsel), for District Council 37, American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, AFL-CIO, Amicus Curiae 
DREYER, BOYAJIAN & TUTTLE, ESQS. (JAMES B. TUTTLE 
of counsel), for Police Conference of New York, 
Inc., Amicus Curiae 
JAY WORONA, ESQ., for New York State School Boards 
Association, Inc., Amicus Curiae 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ., for New York State United 
Teachers, AFL-CIO, Amicus Curiae 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ. (ELIZABETH R. SCHUSTER 
of counsel), for Public Employees Federation, 
Amicus Curiae 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated March 30, 1990, the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director) dismissed this charge filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Dutchess County Education Local 
No. 867, Arlington School District Unit, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) 
against the Arlington Central School District (District). The 
charge alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
subjected a bargaining unit employee, Theresa Davies, to a 
compulsory urinalysis test for drugs.-1 
The Assistant Director accepted the balancing test which 
would be used to determine the constitutionality of the drug test 
ordered in this case as the appropriate test to determine the 
negotiability of the test and found the drug test to be a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
In its exceptions, CSEA argues that the Assistant Director 
misinterpreted and misapplied the balancing test generally used 
to determine negotiability questions. CSEA alleges that the 
balancing test used in a constitutional analysis cannot and 
should not here be equated to the balancing test used to 
-''The Assistant Director had consolidated a second charge 
(Case No. U-10601) with the one now before us. That charge alleged 
that Davies was tested for drugs and then discharged from 
employment in retaliation for her exercise of protected rights. No 
exceptions have been filed to the Assistant Director's dismissal of 
that charge. 
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determine negotiability of the drug test ordered in this case. 
It argues, moreover, that the testing procedures were also placed 
in issue under its charge and that the Assistant Director erred 
by not reaching that issue. 
The—District—argues—in—response-that—it—had—a.—.Legal—duty—to 
test Davies for suspected drug use such that its decision in that 
respect could not be bargained. Alternatively, the District 
argues that the Assistant Director's balancing test was correctly 
framed and applied by him to find that the District's order to 
Davies that she undergo the drug test was not mandatorily 
negotiable. Lastly, the District argues that the testing 
procedures are not in issue under the charge as filed and 
litigated, but, in any event, the procedures used were the same 
as had been used during annual medical examinations of employees. 
Therefore, the District submits that the procedures used in 
Davies' test did not represent any change in its practice. 
The New York State School Boards Association, appearing as 
an amicus curiae, argues that suspicion-based drug testing is not 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. District Council 37, AFSCME, 
the Police Conference of New York, Inc., the New York State 
United Teachers, and the Public Employees Federation, amici 
curiae, argue on several different theories that the drug testing 
ordered in this case is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case are not in dispute and may be briefly 
summarized as follows. 
On September 1, 1988, Davies, a part-time school bus driver 
f-o-r—t-h-e—D-i-s-t-r-i-e-t-7—was—ordered—by—Dl^ %r-i-et—r-epr-es-en-fea-ti-v-es—^ to 
present herself to the District's school physician for urinalysis 
drug testing. Davies, accompanied by her supervisor, John 
Barrett, went to the doctor's office as ordered on September 1, 
1988. Under protest, she there provided a urine sample in a 
paper cup, which she transferred to a plastic bottle pursuant to 
a direction from the doctor's office assistant. The sample was 
then placed into a plastic bag and closed. 
Davies worked for the District during the period from 
September 1 to September 14, 1988, but she was not assigned bus 
driving duties. On or about September 12, 1988, the District 
received a laboratory report issued by International Clinical 
Laboratories, Inc., indicating a positive test result for 
cannabinoids and negative results for ten other drugs.-7 
On September 14, 1988, the District conducted a "stigma or 
name-clearing hearing" for Davies upon charges of testing 
positive for cannabinoids, excessive absenteeism and bringing an 
unloaded firearm onto District property on or about June 18, 
-In addition to testing for cannabinoids, the urine sample was 
tested for the following: amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, 
benzodiazepines, codeine, methadone, methaqualone, opiates, 
phencyclidine and propoxyphene. 
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1988. After that hearing, Davies was discharged from her 
employment. By the District's admission, a "significant" factor 
in the decision to terminate Davies was the cannabinoids-positive 
drug test result. 
The—Dis-trie-t^ - s—decision—to —dire ct—Davies—to—undergo—the—drug 
test was made solely as a result of its receipt of a sworn 
affidavit, provided on or about August 15, 1988, by Anita 
Crapser. In her affidavit, Crapser states that Davies had, on 
three occasions, (twice on January 1, 1988, and once on 
February 14/ 1988) ingested cocaine in Crapser's presence. 
Crapser, who is not a District employee, provided the affidavit 
at the District's request, after Crapser had made the same 
allegations orally to District representatives in June 1988. 
There is no dispute that before the drug test ordered of 
Davies, the District had never required any employee to submit to 
drug testing nor had there been any negotiations between the 
District and CSEA concerning implementation of a drug testing 
program or any procedures relating to drug testing of employees. 
DECISION OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 
The Assistant Director began his analysis of the District's 
duty to negotiate the decision to subject Davies to a drug test 
by reviewing the development of the State and Federal case law 
concerning the constitutionality of drug testing of public 
employees under Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State 
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Constitution and under the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. -f 
From his review of this case law, the Assistant Director 
concluded that the balancing test used to determine the 
©ons-tifeutio n ality— of—d-rug—t e s -ting—i-s—t-h-e—same—balancing—test 
which should be used in determining the negotiability of the test 
required of Davies. The Assistant Director did not decide 
whether the District's decision to test Davies was based upon 
reasonable suspicion, on the ground that if the District could 
have tested Davies randomly, as he held it could, it was 
privileged to test her as it did. He then concluded that for the 
same reasons the drug test would not be unreasonable by 
constitutional standards, it was also not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining under the Act. 
The Assistant Director also concluded that CSEA had not 
questioned before him the negotiability of the testing procedures 
and he did not reach that issue. 
-'Both Constitutions provide: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or things 
to be seized." 
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DISCUSSION 
We begin our analysis by denying such of CSEA's exceptions 
which rest upon its misinterpretation of the Assistant Director's 
decision and such of the District's exceptions which rest upon a 
mis-i-nt-e-rpr-e-tat-ion—of— statute—and—administrative—regulations-. 
As to the former, the Assistant Director did not hold that 
the constitutionality of an employer's action necessarily 
determines the negotiability of that action because the balancing 
tests are always the same. Rather, he correctly noted that in 
some circumstances those governmental interests which make an 
action constitutional can also exempt an employer from a 
statutory duty to bargain regarding that action. Therefore, we 
deny such of CSEA's exceptions as are taken to the Assistant 
Director's articulation of a balancing test. Whether the 
Assistant Director correctly formulated and applied the statutory 
balancing test to the drug test which was ordered in this case is 
a different issue and one which we will address below. 
We similarly reject the District's assertion that it had a 
nondelegable, nonbargainable duty to subject Davies to a drug 
test once it had a reason to believe that she had used a 
controlled substance. The District's arguments in this regard 
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are based upon §913 of the Education Law-; and several 
administrative regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of 
Education which relate to the operation of school buses.-7 
The District's reliance on Education Law §913 is misplaced. 
That—statute--app-l-tes—ortiy—to—medical— examinat-i-ons-7—not—p-ureiy 
investigatory drug testing as was conducted by the District in 
this case. Not only was Davies not given a medical examination, 
but this record shows that drug tests have never been part of any 
required medical or general physical examinations in this 
District. Moreover, even assuming that §913 of the Education Law 
could be read to cover compulsory, investigatory drug testing not 
-/Section 913 of the Education Law, which relates to medical 
examinations of school district personnel, provides as follows: 
In order to safeguard the health of children attending 
the public schools, the board of education or trustees of 
any school district or a board of cooperative educational 
services shall be empowered to require any person 
employed by the board of education or trustees or board 
of cooperative educational services to submit to a 
medical examination by a physician of his choice or 
school medical inspector of the board of education or 
trustees or board of cooperative educational services, in 
order to determine the physical or mental capacity of 
such person to perform his duties. The person required 
to submit to such medical examination shall be entitled 
to be accompanied by a physician or other person of his 
own choice. The findings upon such examination shall be 
reported to the board of education or trustees or board 
of cooperative educational services and may be referred 
to and considered for the evaluation of service of the 
person examined or for disability retirement. 
^N.Y. Comp. Codes R. and Regs, title 8, §156.3 (c), (e), (f), 
& (g) (1991). These provisions pertain generally to safety 
regulations for school bus drivers and pupils, including physical 
fitness criteria, character requirements and driving rules. 
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incident to a medical examination to test for the employee's 
ability to perform his or her job, it is by its very terms only 
an authorization for such testing. A statutory duty which would 
prohibit negotiations or agreements regarding a decision to test 
a-n—empiey e e—f- or— d-r-u-g—us e—i-s—n-e-fe—p-r op e-r-l-y—e © n s t-r-u e-t e d—fr-om—a 
simple grant of an empowerment.-' 
The Commissioner of Education's regulations prove equally 
unavailing to the District. As with Education Law §913, the 
regulations do not include drug testing as part of any required 
physical condition or code of driver conduct. We also do not 
believe that a general duty to ensure the safety of bus 
passengers, which can arguably be extracted from the 
Commissioner's regulations, is properly extended to make 
nondelegable, nonbargainable duties of every means chosen by a 
school district to better ensure that safety. To hold otherwise 
would unjustifiably proscribe the employees' right under the Act 
to have terms and conditions of their employment bargained. 
Having denied the parties' exceptions in the above-mentioned 
respects, it becomes necessary to establish the framework for a 
consideration of the remaining issues. 
First, we decline to assess the parties' rights and 
responsibilities as though the case before us arose in the 
context of a random drug test. However the District's drug test 
-'See generally Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the 
City of New York v. PERB, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB \1012 (1990). 
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of Davies is characterized, it was plainly not a statistically 
random event. Davies was specifically targeted for the required 
drug test based upon some level of suspicion by the District of 
her alleged off-duty use of a controlled substance. We believe 
fe-ha-t—th-e—many— -factors—which—may— app-ropr-ia-teiy—be—con side-red—in— 
assessing the negotiability of drug testing decisions may vary 
according to whether the testing is done randomly or pursuant to 
some individualized suspicion. The negotiability of the 
District's decision to test Davies must be examined, therefore, 
within the context in which the decision was actually made, not 
as it might otherwise have been made. Therefore, we decline to 
adopt the Assistant Director's determination that the District 
had no duty to bargain the decision to test Davies because it 
could have unilaterally subjected her to a random drug test. The 
negotiability of an employer's decision to subject employees in 
safety-sensitive positions to a random drug test is not before us 
in this case and we express no opinion on that issue here.-'' 
Turning to the case as presented, the issue is whether the 
District could subject Davies to a compulsory urinalysis drug 
test without first having to negotiate that decision with CSEA. 
The negotiability of that decision turns, as the Assistant 
Director correctly observed, upon a balancing of competing 
-'Vie. did consider that issue in City of Buffalo (Police 
Department) , 20 PERB [^3048 (1987) . The disposition of this case 
does not necessitate any reexamination of that decision at this 
time. 
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interests. Davies' interests lie in her personal privacy, 
reputation and job security, interests which we have held can 
trigger a bargaining obligation.-'' As to the District, only its 
managerial interests as an employer are material to the balance 
used—i-n—making-—the—neg-stia-bii-i-fey—d-e-te-pmina-fe-i-o-n-.--^ —The—o-n-l-y 
mission-related, managerial interest asserted by the District in 
justification of its decision to test Davies is the safe 
transportation of its students. The burden rests with the 
District to establish that Davies' testing was necessitated by 
this interest. The District, as an employer, had no interest in 
Davies' off-duty use of any drug except and to the extent that 
her alleged use impaired her ability to drive a bus safely. 
However, no evidence was presented in this case that Davies' job 
performance was actually impaired, that any on-the-job drug use 
occurred or from which suspicion of impairment could reasonably 
be inferred. 
In establishing a link between an employee's off-duty use of 
drugs and job impairment, we acknowledge that there can be 
reasonable argument made as to whether and at what point the 
-'See, e.g. , Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the 
City of New York v. PERB, supra, note 6. 
-''it is for that reason that the factors used in assessing the 
constitutionality of an action may be different from those used in 
making a negotiability determination. For example, a 
constitutional analysis might include policy considerations which 
are not appropriately considered in a negotiability determination 
because they are divorced from the employment relationship. That, 
in part, explains why an action may be simultaneously 
constitutional yet mandatorily negotiable. 
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former can satisfactorily evidence the latter. Without deciding 
those issues, we will assume for purposes of this decision that 
off-duty drug use by persons who hold safety-sensitive jobs can 
sometimes be used to evidence a reasonable suspicion of 
impairment-. T-ha-t—of-f--duty— drug—use—and—a-ny—test—to—determine 
such use, however, must be reasonably proximate to the employee's 
job performance. If the off-duty drug use is remote from the 
time at which the employee is called upon to render services, the 
employer's interest in having an employee subjected to a drug 
test to determine that use is not reasonably related to the 
delivery of its services or the accomplishment of its mission. 
In that circumstance, the balance of competing interests 
necessarily weighs in favor of the mandatory negotiability of a 
decision to subject an employee to a urinalysis test for drug use 
because only the employee's interests are affected. 
Applying these standards to the facts of this case, it is 
readily apparent that the District's decision to subject Davies 
to compulsory urinalysis testing for drugs was mandatorily 
negotiable. The District tested Davies on September 1, 1988 
pursuant to a report that she had used drugs while off duty twice 
on January 1, 1988 and once on February 14, 1988. Her reported 
uses occurred when school was not in session and the last was 
more than six months before the test was ordered and administered 
and several months before Davies last drove a bus for the 
District. There is, furthermore, no evidence that her off-duty 
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use occurred within a timeframe within which it might be inferred 
that she drove a bus while impaired. On these facts, the 
District's order to Davies that she undergo urinalysis testing 
for off-duty drug use was not reasonably proximate to her alleged 
use—nor—was—it—ot-he-rwise—grounded—upon—a—reasonable—suspicion 
that she drove or attempted to drive a bus in an impaired 
condition. As such, the decision to subject her to that test was 
mandatorily negotiable. 
Having found on this fact-specific analysis that the 
District did not have a reasonable suspicion of actual on-the-job 
impairment or such off-duty use which might evidence an 
impairment at a time reasonably proximate to the date it tested 
Davies, we do not decide whether or to what extent reasonable 
suspicion drug testing of persons in safety-sensitive positions 
is mandatorily negotiable. As with the negotiability of random 
drug tests for persons in such positions, we leave that issue for 
decision when required by the facts of a future case. 
CSEA also excepts to the Assistant Director's determination 
that the negotiability of the drug testing procedures was not 
before him. Having read the charge as filed and the transcript 
of the hearings, we agree with the Assistant Director's decision 
in this respect and, accordingly, deny this exception. Any 
references to the testing methodology in the charge as filed or 
in the case as litigated occurs only in the context of the 
District's decision to test Davies and only as a background to a 
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consideration of that issue. Any remaining question in this 
respect is resolved by the brief CSEA filed with the Assistant 
Director, in which only the District's order that Davies undergo 
a drug test is identified as the issue for decision. As we will 
no -t^-s-0 ns-id-e-r— -a-l-l-e ga-tio ns—wh-i-c h—a-r-e—n o t—r a-i-s e d—,i-n—a—char ge—or— a 
timely amendment thereto,—'' we affirm the Assistant Director's 
decision not to address the negotiability of the procedures 
incident to the District's drug test of Davies. 
Turning to the remedy, we would ordinarily order Davies 
reinstated to her former position with back pay and benefits as 
we did in City of Buffalo (Police Department)—/. We take 
notice, however, of an arbitration award dated September 12, 1989 
in which an arbitrator ordered Davies reinstated without back pay 
effective September 18, 1989, approximately one year after the 
date of her discharge from employment. From facts alleged and 
admitted in a second improper practice charge involving Davies 
filed by CSEA against the District,—/we know that the District 
reinstated Davies pursuant to the arbitration award and ordered 
•^East Moriches Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB ^[3056 (1981) . 
—
/S_up_ra note 7. In that case, we held that the City of 
Buffalo had improperly required probationary police officers to 
submit to random drug testing. As part of the remedy in that case, 
we ordered the reinstatement of one employee who had been 
discharged because he had tested positive for the presence of a 
controlled substance. 
—
/U-11278. This charge is presently pending before the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation. 
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her to report to work on September 18, 1989 to be subjected that 
date to a drug test as permitted by the arbitrator's award. She 
refused to take that test and resigned her employment after she 
had been suspended by the District. CSEA alleges in that charge 
that—the—Di-st-rist^s—ac--tion s—foliowing—her—-reinstatement—were 
improper. Therefore, Davies was reinstated by the District and 
an order from us that she be reinstated would be unnecessary and 
confusing. The propriety of this other disciplinary action and 
Davies' reinstatement rights may be tested, as appropriate, by 
grievance under the parties' contract, by judicial action or 
proceeding, or by the other improper practice charge. 
We also believe that a monetary remedy is neither necessary 
nor appropriate as a consequence of the District's September 1, 
1988 drug test. The arbitrator held that Davies was properly 
disciplined for her possession on school property of an unloaded 
hand gun. As we read the arbitrator's award, the unpaid 
suspension was based substantially upon that infraction.. To 
order a monetary remedy would negate the arbitrator's award which 
was based, in relevant part, upon grounds unrelated to the drug 
test which is the issue before us. Moreover, a monetary order in 
this case would alter the rights and duties which the parties 
acquired and assumed under their contract. For these reasons, we 
do not believe that a monetary remedy would effectuate the 
policies of the Act. 
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We conclude our discussion with an observation and a 
suggestion. As is readily apparent, the negotiability of drug 
testing decisions, procedures and penalties are complex and 
controversial issues. The disposition of these issues is 
potentially—af-fected—by— a—great—number— of—factors-:which—will 
undoubtedly vary case by case. For these reasons, we believe 
that all employers and unions subject to our jurisdiction would 
be well-advised to negotiate comprehensive drug testing policies 
if they have not already done so, before the need for testing of 
any particular persons arises. The alternative can only be 
recurrent litigation which will not well serve the policies of 
the Act, the best interests of employers and unions or the large 
number of individuals who are affected by the many problems 
associated with drug use within the employment context. 
For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the District's 
order to Davies that she undergo an involuntary urinalysis test 
for drugs represented a unilateral change in a mandatorily 
negotiable subject in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. The 
Assistant Director's decision dismissing the charge is, 
therefore, reversed. 
Accordingly, the District IS HEREBY ORDERED to post notice 
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in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used to post 
notices of information to bargaining unit employees. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
rperson Paul'ine R. Kinsella, Chai 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
RUBLIC EMPLOyMENT_RELATIONS_BOARD_ 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 ail employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Dutchess County Education 
Local No. 867,'Arlington School District Unit, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
that, the Arlington Central School District has been found to 
have violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act by subjecting Theresa Davies 
to a drug test on September 1, 1988. 
ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2F - 1/31/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBANY PERMANENT PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS, 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL NOS. 2007 and 2007-A, 
AFL-CIO-CLC, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-11948 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
VINCENT J. McARDLE, JR., CORPORATION COUNSEL (WILLIAM M. 
GOLDSTEIN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Albany 
Permanent Professional Firefighters Association, Local Nos. 2007 
and 2007-A, AFL-CIO-CLC (APPFA) and cross-exceptions filed by the 
City of Albany (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ). APPFA alleges that the City violated §209-a.l(a), 
(c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when, on September 20, 199 0, it issued a memorandum stating that 
it would not pay unit employees for the time they spent traveling 
on a temporary work assignment called a detail. 
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After hearing, the ALJ dismissed the subparagraph (a) and 
(c) allegations for lack of proof.-; He reached the merits of 
the unilateral change allegation filed under §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act despite the pendency of a contract grievance filed by APPFA 
which alleges, inter alia, that the City's memorandum violated 
the parties' then existing contract, an allegation which is twice 
repeated in the charge itself. 
Had the charge alleged only a violation of §209-a.l(d) of 
the Act, the ALJ stated that he would have applied our decision 
in Herkimer County BOCES-7 and deferred the jurisdictional 
determination necessary to the disposition of the unilateral 
change allegation to the still-pending grievance. The ALJ, 
however, declined to defer the jurisdictional determination, 
because several days of hearing had been held on the interference 
and discrimination allegations. The ALJ then dismissed the 
interference and discrimination allegations, as noted, and he 
dismissed the unilateral change aspect of the charge on a finding 
that the City's memorandum did not change its practice regarding 
travel pay, making no determination concerning jurisdiction under 
§205.5(d) of the Act. He found that the City's practice was not 
to pay employees for travel when on a detail and that the City's 
memorandum merely restated that existing practice. 
-'-'No exceptions have been taken to this aspect of the ALJ's 
decision. 
?/20 PERB H3050 (1987) . 
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APPFA alleges in its exceptions that the City's memorandum 
created a new practice where none previously existed because 
employees had never before asked to be paid for travel while on 
detail because they did not know that they might have a right to 
be paid for that time. According to APPFA, the employees' demand 
for pay, coupled with a large increase in the number of details 
necessitated by a work schedule change which the City had earlier 
implemented, established circumstances to which the City's former 
nonpayment practice did not apply. 
The City alleges in its cross-exceptions that the charge is 
untimely because it was filed more than four months after APPFA 
first knew that demands for pay for detail travel would not be 
granted. The City otherwise argues that the ALJ's decision on 
the merits of the charge is correct. 
Although no exceptions have been filed to the ALJ's 
treatment of the jurisdictional issue, we are obliged to reach 
that issue because it concerns our power to entertain the 
remaining unilateral change allegation. Pursuant to §2 05.5(d) of 
the Act,-'' the Legislature has made clear that it is not within 
our power to either entertain alleged contract violations or 
enforce a collective bargaining agreement. APPFA's grievance, 
-''Section 2 05.5(d) in relevant part provides: 
[T]he board shall not have authority to enforce an 
agreement between an employer and employee organization 
and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice. 
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which involves the same subject matter as its improper practice 
charge, coupled with certain of the allegations in its charge, 
necessarily raise a jurisdictional question affecting the 
unilateral change allegation made under §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Although we have jurisdiction over the subparagraph (a) and 
(c) allegations, we do not by virtue of that fact automatically 
acquire jurisdiction over the subparagraph (d) allegation. The 
jurisdictional inquiry under §205.5(d) of the Act is issue 
oriented. Each allegation in the charge must be considered 
separately in determining whether we have been empowered to 
consider the merits of the particular allegation. Were we to 
follow the jurisdictional approach taken by the ALJ in this case, 
a charging party alleging a unilateral change which arguably 
violated its contract could always evade the jurisdictional 
limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act simply by adding one or more 
different improper practice allegations to its unilateral change 
allegation. This result is plainly inconsistent with the 
Legislature's intention to restrict our role in contract 
interpretation and enforcement to the extent necessary to decide 
statutory questions. Therefore, we hold that the ALJ did not 
have the discretion to reach the merits of the §2 09-a.l(d) 
allegation without first disposing of the jurisdictional 
question. 
The ALJ could have disposed of the jurisdictional question 
in one of two ways. He could have applied our decision in 
Herkimer BOCES as he stated he would have had the interference 
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and discrimination allegations not been litigated. Under that 
approach, the subparagraph (d) allegation would have been 
conditionally dismissed and the jurisdictional determination 
would have been deferred to the pending grievance with the 
possibility that that aspect of the charge could have been 
reopened after arbitration. Hearings would then have been held 
only on the interference and discrimination allegations. 
Alternatively, the ALJ could have decided the jurisdictional 
question. If he concluded that there was jurisdiction over the 
unilateral change allegation, he would then have proceeded to a 
consideration of the merits of that allegation, together with the 
other claims. If he concluded that there was no jurisdiction 
over that allegation, he would have unconditionally dismissed it 
for that reason without considering the merits of the allegation. 
We have not had occasion before this case to decide how we 
should treat a jurisdictional issue when it is raised in a charge 
in conjunction with other allegations which do not present any 
jurisdictional questions. Of the two choices available to the 
ALJ, we think the second is preferable as a matter of policy. 
The approach we adopt for the disposition of this jurisdictional 
issue is much the same as the one we have taken for the deferral 
of the merits of improper practice allegations when all of those 
allegations have been determined to be within our jurisdiction. 
As exemplified by our decision in Connetquot Central School 
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District,-'' we have chosen not to defer any improper practice 
allegation over which we have jurisdiction unless we can properly 
defer all the allegations in the charge, in order to avoid 
multiplicity of forums to the extent possible. 
Reaching that jurisdictional issue, we hold that we do not 
have jurisdiction over the subparagraph (d) allegation because it 
raises only a breach of contract claim which the Association 
would have us remedy by enforcing the contract provisions. 
Although, as the ALJ noted, the contract may not have a provision 
covering compensation for travel time specifically, it does have 
provisions covering compensation for hours worked and it is those 
latter provisions of the contract which APPFA alleges the City 
violated when it promulgated the memorandum in issue. From 
APPFA's charge as filed, its grievance, and its supporting 
arguments, it is plain that APPFA alleges that it has already 
bargained with the City regarding pay for detail travel through 
the hours worked clause and that the parties have reached an 
agreement on that subject which requires the City to pay for that 
travel. The allegations in the charge cannot be read to set 
forth a colorable claim of statutory violation separate and apart 
from this arguable contract violation. As such, a dismissal for 
lack of jurisdiction is required.-'' 
^19 PERB ^3045 (1986). 
^Warsaw Cent. School Dist., 23 PERB ^3022 (1990) ; County of 
Suffolk, 22 PERB H3033 (1989). 
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Having decided that we do not have jurisdiction over the 
§209-a.l(d) allegation, we do not consider either APPFA's or the 
City's exceptions on the merits of the case. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it alleges a 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
DATED: January 31, 19 9 2 
Albany, New York 
\\ 
Pauline R. kinsella^ Chairperson 
alter L. Eisenberg, Member (, W  
Schmertz, Member 
#2G - 1/31/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
WILLIAM T. BRUNS, 
Charging Party 
-and- CASE NO. U-12252 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF PAROLE) 
and COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, 
Respondents. 
WILLIAM T. BRUNS, pro se 
WALTER PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (LAUREN DE SOLE of counsel), 
for Respondent State of New York 
PETER SCAGNELLI, ESQ., for Respondent Council 82, AFSCME 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
William T. Bruns, by motion, seeks our review of rulings 
made by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) during the processing 
of his still-pending improper practice charge against the State 
of New York (Division of Parole) and Council 82, AFSCME.17 
Bruns asks us to review the ALJ's allegedly incorrect ruling 
on an offer of proof he submitted, at the ALJ's direction, which 
limited the issues in his charge, and the ALJ's refusal to recuse 
-''Such interlocutory review is authorized in our discretion 
under §204.7(h) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) which we have 
interpreted to apply to pre-hearing rulings. Brunswick Cent. 
School Dist., 19 PERB H3018 (1986). 
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herself from the proceeding.-; Bruns alleges in the latter 
respect that the ALJ is biased against him as evidenced by her 
ruling on his offer of proof and her conduct in processing his 
charge to date. 
An—inter-1-eeut-ory— a-ppe-a-1—fa=Giti—r-u-1-i-ng-s—by—an—A-LJ—is—proper-1-y 
entertained only if our failure to consider the appeal would 
result in harm to a party which cannot be remedied by our review 
of the ALJ's final decision and order.-x We are persuaded that 
the ALJ's evidentiary ruling can be properly reviewed in the 
normal course of considering such exceptions to the ALJ's final 
decision and order as may be filed. We are not inclined to give 
interlocutory review to an ALJ's refusal to recuse himself or 
herself from a proceeding on a party's allegations of bias except 
in circumstances in which those allegations set forth facts upon 
which the ALJ's disqualification would be required. Brun's bias 
allegations, however, are not of that type. The motion for 
interlocutory review of the ALJ's denial of Brun's recusal motion 
and her evidentiary rulings is accordingly denied at this time. 
Our denial of Brun's motion with respect to either of the ALJ's 
rulings is without prejudice to his right to file exceptions to 
the ALJ's decision pursuant to §204.10 of the Rules. 
^ R u l e s § 2 0 4 . 7 ( h ) ( 1 ) . 
^ U n i t e d Un iv . P r o f e s s i o n s , 19 PERB ^[3009 (1986) . 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the motion be, and it hereby 
is, denied. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
•^tod^4 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
#3A - 1/31/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 2 0 0B, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3782 
CENTRAL NEW YORK REGIONAL MARKET AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 200B, Service Employees 
International Union, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit found to be appropriate and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Maintenance supervisor, collector, janitor, 
maintenance man III and maintenance man. 
Excluded: Administrative director, assistant director and 
secretary. 
Certification - C-3782 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 200B, Service Employees 
International Union. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
£-L„ nV,:Jr 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Au4<£L- ¥. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jy^Schmertz, Member^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SOUTHERN ADIRONDACK SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS 
ALLIANCE, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3 8 67 
SARATOGA-WARREN COUNTIES BOARD OF 
COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Southern Adirondack 
Substitute Teachers Alliance, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who have been 
given reasonable assurance of continued 
employment 
Excluded: All other employees 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shaLl—negoiiaie_coll-ectiv^ely~wdt:h_the_S-0-U-thern—Adi-rondack 
Substitute Teachers Alliance, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to .a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
L/LLA&Z— f^ ^j6**»—*•***—^i^*" T 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membejt 
&£c± 
Schmertz, Member^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3836 
CENTERPORT FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Firehousemen, excluding part-time. 
Excluded: Elected commissioners and district 
secretary/manager. 
Certification - C-3836 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 342, Long Island Public 
Service Employees, UMD, ILA, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times—and—confer— in—good—faith—with—r:esp_ect_J:o—wa^ es_,__hLoiix:s_, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: January 31, 1992 
Albany, New York 
-Xk Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Uvd^z^ *• 
Walter L. Eisenberg, MemMer 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member/ /i 
